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Summary: After the breakup of former Yugoslavia Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia
followed different income tax reform trajectories that could explain currently dif-
ferent levels of income inequality in these countries. Our paper analyzes redis-
tributive effects of introducing progressive tax systems, like the ones currently
implemented in Slovenia and Croatia, in the Serbian context. Using microsimu-
lation modeling and Survey on Income and Living Conditions data for 2017 our
results suggest that implementation of both Croatian and Slovenian tax system 
would yield lower levels of income inequality and poverty if applied in Serbia.
Slovenian system achieves larger decrease in inequality due to higher tax bur-
den on the top incomes and brings significant increase in tax revenues. Croatian 
tax schedule achieves stronger decrease in poverty as more generous personal
allowance exempt higher portions of low incomes from labour taxes. 
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Three decades after the breakup of Yugoslavia its successor states took different wel-
fare state trajectories that could explain current varying levels of income inequality. 
Slovenia has one of the lowest income inequalities in Europe, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Croatia is currently at the European Union average level of inequality, 
while Serbia marks one of the highest income inequality levels in Europe.  
This paper investigates the relationship between income inequality and different 
personal income tax (PIT) regimes that these three countries adopted after the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia. Unlike Slovenia and Croatia that implemented modern progressive 
income tax schedule Serbia opted for a flat income tax, an avant-garde neoliberal pol-
icy. Avant-garde in a sense that this reform was not advocated neither by the European 
Union institutions in the process of accession, nor the international financial institu-
tions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  
Flat tax proposal were debated in Slovenia and Croatia on several occasions but 
never accepted due to equity consideration and both countries have retained progres-
sive tax schedules. In a desire to attract investors many transition economies, Serbia 
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being one of them, adopted these kind of experimental flat tax reform without any 
serious considerations about the effects of such an option on inequality. This was sur-
prising given the common background of these former Yugoslav socialist societies 
built upon the principles of solidarity and equality.  
In this paper we discus different ways tax systems have developed in each of 
the three countries and draw conclusions about the reasons for these differences 
grounded in a political economy framework. We explore the influence of the ideology 
of external actors on these systems, such as the international institutions, and discuss 
internal factors that shaped the debate on tax reforms. We use 2017 Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions (SILC) (2017)1 data and ex-ante microsimulation approach to 
examine inequality, poverty and public finance implications of translating progressive 
personal income tax systems currently implemented in Slovenia and Croatia to a Ser-
bian context. Our papers provides new contribution to a very limited literature that 
investigates the redistributive effects of introducing progressive tax schedules in for-
mer communist countries. Most of the work so far has been concentrated on analysing 
effects of flat tax in both transition and developing countries at the time of high popu-
larity of this policy proposal.  
Article is structured in the following way. After this introduction, first section 
discusses how flat tax became popular in former communist countries and presents the 
most important changes to the personal tax systems in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia 
since the breakup. Second section reviews the literature that uses microsimulation 
models in tax policy analysis. Third section describes the data and the methodology 
while fourth section presents and discusses the results. Final section concludes the ar-
ticle. 
 
1. Reforms of the Personal Income Tax System in Former Communist 
Countries 
 
1.1 Reasons for Introducing Flat Taxes  
 
The real era of flat tax started in the first decade after the collapse of communism in 
Baltic countries and Russia. Then in 2000s Ukraine, Georgia and Romania followed 
suit (Boris Majcen, Miroslav Verbič, and Mitja Čok 2009). In total, over twenty post-
communist European and Eurasian countries adopted this policy solution. What is in-
teresting from the political economy perspective is that this proposal was never advo-
cated by the European Union actors in the process of accession nor by the World Bank 
or the International Monetary Fund, two institutions that are often regarded as propo-
nents of the liberal economic and social reforms. Their role in this area in transition 
countries has been quite different. Not only that they did not push for the introduction 
of the flat tax, but instead warned that it could bring less revenues and that it is not an 
ideal solution for countries with high income inequality.  
The greatest support for the flat tax came from the region itself. Informal net-
works of politicians and non-governmental organizations, together with some 
 
1 Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC). 2017. 
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-silc/surveyonincomeandlivingconditionssilc2017/. 
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American right-wing think tanks, that provided theoretical arguments for the flat tax, 
pushed the topic high on the agenda. For policy makers in transition countries choice 
of the flat tax served as signal that they are at the forefront of liberal reforms on a 
global scale, as such a system is rarely found in developed or developing countries. 
They advertised it a simple, business-friendly tax scheme that would boost interna-
tional competitiveness of the country. Any within country flat tax opposition was 
weakened by the fact that rising number of neighbouring countries was adopting the 
flat tax (Hilary Appel and Mitchell A. Orenstein 2018).  
Advocates of flat tax solutions in former communist countries argued that flat 
tax would bring more revenue to the government since lower tax rate would create less 
distortions for economic activity and drive some of the taxpayers out of the shadow 
economy. Anna Ivanova, Michael Keen, and Alexander Klemm (2005) showed that 
despite increase in PIT revenues after the introduction of flat tax in Russia in 2001 it 
is hard to attribute this surge in tax receipt to the reform itself. Their analysis suggests 
that the surge in PIT revenues in Russia over this period was largely driven by an 
increase in real wage rates unrelated to the reform. Slovak flat tax reform of 2004 made 
the system more simple but the increase in PIT revenues was quite modest (Jan Remeta 
et al. 2015). In 2013, flat tax rate was abolished and personal income tax system was 
made more progressive which was seen as a response to the increase in the share of 
population supporting the view that the government should reduce income differences 
in Slovakia.  
Second argument for adopting flat tax was that tax administration in post-com-
munist countries is not yet capable of dealing with more complex tax schedules. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, proponents argued that flax tax would enhance incentives 
for working (labour supply), saving, investing and taking risks (entrepreneurship) and 
in the end boost competitiveness of the country. This was mostly theoretical reasoning 
as no evidence existed that introduction of the flat tax would bring these positive ef-
fects. Before the 1990s except Hong Kong no country had experience with the flat tax 
(Appel and Orenstein 2018).  
There was a lengthy discussion about flat tax in Slovenia but in the end equity 
considerations prevailed over the efficiency arguments and the proposal was not 
adopted. Croatia considered flat tax proposals on several occasions but similar to Slo-
venia retained the progressive structure of the personal income tax system. Serbia em-
braced flat tax policy from the start of its post-2000s transition to a market economy 
without any serious considerations about the effects of such an option on inequality.  
 
1.2 Personal Income Tax Reforms in Former Yugoslav Countries 
 
This section discusses most important changes in the PIT systems that affected its re-
distributive capacity in all the three countries after the breakup of Yugoslavia. We 
focus on the political economy framework of debates that surrounded changes to the 
tax system especially when it comes to the proposals for the introduction of the flat 
tax. 
 Slovenia and Serbia embraced progressive tax schedules from the very start 
and in 1991 adopted tax systems with five tax brackets, going from 16% to 50% tax 
rates, and several tax allowances. Reform was led by country experts who were looking 
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at modern tax systems in Europe and other developed countries. In Serbia, it was ar-
gued that switch to progressive tax system would provide generous tax base and 
achieve more equitable taxation. However, turbulent political and economic circum-
stances (civil war and economic sanctions imposed by the international community) 
have effectively suspended the law  and it was never applied in its true form. 
First Croatian Minister of Finance in the post-independence period, professor 
Hanžeković, was in favour of retaining a cedular system of direct taxation from the 
Yugoslav period. That was in essence a proportional tax system with single rate ap-
plied to different sources of income at the moment they are generated. There was also 
an additional component in the form of progressive tax rates paid by those individuals 
whose total annual income exceeds certain threshold. Minister of Finance was also 
leading the first working group aimed at drafting new personal income tax law and at 
some point suggested a flat tax proposal that could made Croatia a first post socialist 
country to adopt such a system. However, after signing a technical cooperation with 
Germany their experts were in favour of introducing a modern, synthetic tax schedule 
with progressive tax rates arguing that a Croatian cedular system is old fashioned. Ac-
cording to Božidar Jeličić and Predrag Bejaković (2012), the influence of the German 
experts, most notably professor Manfred Rose from the University of Heidelberg and 
his team, was so strong that he could be regarded as the creator of the modern Croatian 
taxation system. Though equity considerations were leading the changes in the realm 
of income taxation, as argued by its creators, the new system, introduced in 1994, had 
only two brackets with the corresponding rates of 20% and 35%. In other European 
countries highest tax rate was between 46% and 60% at that time (Jeličić and Beja-
ković 2012). The number of tax brackets, allowances and deductions has increased 
over the years as well as the highest tax rate on personal income.  
Wave of flat tax proposals reached Slovenia in 2004 when discussion emerged 
both in expert circles and wider public about the necessity to simplify the existing tax 
code. Also, there were concerns that Slovenia has one of the highest tax burdens on 
labour as besides PIT, social security contributions and a payroll tax were levied on 
wages. One of the proposals was to introduce a flat tax on income looking at the expe-
rience of Slovakia. It was widely discussed in the media but the response was mixed. 
While the big corporations have endorsed the idea, believing that more simplified tax 
schedule would improve the competiveness, trade unions rejected the proposal believ-
ing that this could lead to abolishment of the reduced VAT rate leaving only one, 
higher rate. Flat tax proposal was even included in a government list of reforms in the 
following years when wide political, public and professional discussions continued 
regarding further steps of the personal income reform. Several projections regarding 
the effects of the reform were produced. Besides the governmental one, there were 
independent estimates from the academia. In the end, in 2007 flat tax proposal was not 
accepted and Slovenia retained a progressive tax schedule though simplified with three 
tax brackets. For labour income, highest marginal tax rate was lowered from 50% to 
41% while a 20% flat tax rate for income from capital was introduced. Most allow-
ances were preserved and those for children increased (Čok and Ivica Urban 2007; 
Majcen, Verbič, and Čok 2009). 
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Proposals to introduce flat tax system in Croatia came during the economic cri-
sis in 2009 and then again in 2013 when the Minister of Finance was in favour of the 
idea arguing that more simple tax system would bring new investors to the country. 
There was no intense public debate as in the case of Slovenia, apart from the several 
academic contributions describing the efficiency arguments for the introduction of the 
flat tax. In the end, proposal was rejected for equity reasons (Helena Blažić et al. 2017). 
The first half of 2000s saw the highest increase in the number of other transition 
economies that adopted a flat tax and that certainly influenced PIT reforms in Serbia 
after the turbulent 1990s and the regime changes in 2000. Starting as late reformer, 
there was a need to signal that the new government is committed to market-oriented 
policies and flat tax was considered to be a business-friendly solution. It is, however, 
unusual that despite sharing a common socialist background with Slovenia and Croa-
tia, discussion of distributional effects of tax reforms in Serbia was completely ne-
glected. In fact, there was no particular discussion around the reform and new Personal 
Income Tax Law adopted in 2001 re-installed the cedular system from former Yugo-
slavia. As already explained, it is in essence a flat tax system where majority of citizens 
pay only a wage tax with single tax rate. Other sources of income are much less im-
portant since the share of revenues from wage tax in total income tax revenues has 
been close to 90% in the whole post-2000 period. There are no family allowances ex-
cept for those that pay annual income tax and these are the individuals whose total 
annual income exceeds certain threshold (three and six times average annual salary in 
Serbia). They are obliged to pay additional, so called annual income tax at progressive 
tax rates of 10% and 15%. Since less than 1% of total number of taxpayers actually 
pays the annual income tax, redistributive capacity of the personal income tax system 
is very low (Saša Randjelović and Jelena Žarković Rakić 2013).  
As Mihail Arandarenko and Pavle Golicin (2007) argue, the real question is not 
how it was possible to install unheard-of system of personal income taxation which 
cannot be found in this form in any European country (and beyond), but rather how 
come that this first-class issue later never really reached electoral, public or policy 
debate. The latest change to the PIT system in Serbia that influenced its progressivity 
came in 2007 when zero tax bracket was introduced. But it did not come out of desire 
to increase the vertical equity of the tax system by making it more progressive. This 
was almost a side result of a decision of the Ministry of Finance to lower the wage tax 
revenues in order to cut the budgetary surplus. As for the public debate, this change 
went almost unnoticed (Arandarenko and Golicin 2007). 
Following the 2008 economic crisis Slovenia was particularly concerned for 
lower income population and PIT reforms increased the progressiveness of the tax sys-
tem. For those at the bottom of the income distribution general allowance was in-
creased while for top income earners new, higher tax rate was introduced (Čok, Urban, 
and Verbič 2013; Urban, Čok, and Verbič 2019). Croatia experienced negative eco-
nomic growth rates for nearly seven years following the 2008 crisis. Arguing that this 
could improve the competitiveness of the troubled economy number of PIT rates was 
reduced over the years and some most recent changes aimed to reduce the tax burden 
for high skilled individuals that are migrating from the country (Karlo Vajdić 2018). 
In Serbia, only with the release of the first results of the Survey on Income and Living 
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Conditions in 2013, showing that the country records the highest income inequality 
among European countries, advocates of the progressive personal income tax system 
have become somewhat more visible (Gorana Krstić and Žarković Rakić 2017). 
 
2. Using Microsimulation Models in Tax Policy Analysis: A Survey of 
the Existing Literature 
 
There is an extensive literature on the application of microsimulation techniques to the 
analysis of reforms of in the area of tax and social transfers policies (Anthony Atkinson 
and Holy Sutherland 1988; Francois Bourguignon and Amadeo Spadaro 2006; Fran-
cesco Figari, Alari Paulus, and Sutherland 2015). In the context of European countries 
besides individual country models there is also an integrated EU-wide model, EURO-
MOD, used to simulate individual tax liabilities and social benefit entitlements accord-
ing to the rules in place in each of the twenty-eight member states. It is designed for 
making cross-country comparisons and for answering “what if” questions such as what 
would happen when we substitute (“swap”) tax or benefit system from one country to 
another (Sutherland and Figari 2013). For a wide coverage of non-European tax and 
benefit systems using a unified methodology there is a modeling approach of the Com-
mitment to Equity (CEQ) Institute (Nora Lustig 2018). Both models are based on mi-
cro-data on income, earnings, labor market and the socio-demographic variables. 
While EUROMOD-like models choose to simulate benefits and taxes rather 
than to use data from surveys (Christine Lietz and Daniela Mantovani 2006), CEQ 
view this method as discarding useful information from the data which is a more ac-
curate reflection of reality than pure simulation. In this paper we rely on CEQ approach 
by taking all the available information from the survey (income components and social 
transfers) and simulating taxes. This is not only due to our interest to analyze a switch 
from a flat to a progressive system in Serbia but also because the data that we use do 
not contain the information on taxes paid and need to be simulated.  
The main output of the microsimulation model are the changes in the household 
disposable income that arise as a consequences of a policy reform. They are calculated 
by adding up market income over each household member then subtracting simulated 
values of taxes for different reform scenarios (income tax, social contributions and 
other direct personal taxes), and adding cash and non-cash benefits and between-
household transfers (e.g. alimony) available in the data. Household disposable incomes 
are equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence scale.  
Changes in disposable income that result after the implementation of reform in 
the realm of taxes, contributions or social transfers are used for the analysis of income 
inequality, poverty and budgetary effects of the reform. In this paper, reform scenario 
is a policy swap in which we analyze effects, on a sample of Serbian households, of 
replacing the Serbian personal tax system with Croatian and Slovenian one. Policy 
swapping analysis using microsimulation models consist of borrowing policies that 
prove to be effective in one country and implement them in other countries, in order 
to understand the effects of such a tax or benefit instrument on different population 
(Figari 2009). This allows policy learning. The work of Atkinson, Francois Bougui-
gnon, and Pierre Chiappori (1988) was pioneering in this field when they applied 
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British tax system to French population. As they argued, comparing for example mar-
ginal tax rates of the British and French tax codes using their respective survey data is 
only suggestive, but not entirely relevant to the discussion of tax reform in either of 
the two countries. The effect of a particular policy depends not only on the policy 
design but also on the characteristics of the country in question. So, when discussing 
tax reforms the value of international comparisons, as they argue, lies in exploring the 
implications of applying a tax code of country X to the population of country Y (or vice 
versa). Some more recent applications of policy swapping include child policy bor-
rowing between three European countries with very different systems: Austria, Spain 
and United Kingdome (Horacio Levy, Christine Lietz, and Sutherland 2007). Results 
show how relevant is policy borrowing exercise in distinguishing between the three 
factors that affect the final policy outcome: the level of spending, policy design and 
characteristics of national population. 
At the time of rising popularity of flat taxes in former communist countries, 
Paulus et al. (2009) used microsimulation modeling to estimate the potential impact of 
several flat tax scenarios on household incomes in three Eastern European countries – 
Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. They found that all scenarios would have negative 
effect on inequality and poverty, and most of the cost of the reform would be borne by 
lower income groups. Popularity of flat taxes motivated research in Western European 
countries and several papers have analyzed the effects of moving from progressive to 
flat tax schedules. Using microsimulation model Andre Decoster, Kris De Swerdt, and 
Kristian Orsini (2008) showed that introduction of revenue-neutral flat tax in Belgium 
would bring positive albeit very limited effects on labour supply. And this comes at a 
high price: large gain in disposable income for the three highest deciles and the losses 
for the lower half of the income distribution. Clemens Fuest, Peichl, and Thilo 
Schaefer (2008) analyse introduction of the flat tax with the help of microsimulation 
model for the German tax and transfer system (FiFoSiM). They find modest efficiency 
gains – the welfare gain equals 1.8% of overall income tax revenue and employment 
increases by 0.3% – that come at the cost of an high increase in income inequality. In 
particular, the top income decile benefits while the upper middle class suffers losses. 
Paulus and Andrea Peichl (2009) use EUROMOD to assess the effects of flat tax for 
ten European countries. They find that the main problem of implementing a flat rate 
tax could be to convince a majority of the population that redistribution in favour of 
the highest income decile is acceptable since that is what their results show.  
Finally, most recent literature motivated by the rising inequality of some of the 
Central and Eastern European countries have started analysing effects of introducing 
progressive tax schedules in these economies. Using EUROMOD microsimulation 
framework and macro model paper by Salvador Barrios et al. (2020) analyze fiscal, 
redistributive and macroeconomic impact of several progressive tax scenarios in Bul-
garia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania. They find positive effects on 
redistribution and inequaity in all countries. Reducing taxes for low (medium) income 
individuals increases their incentives for being employed, while raising taxes on high 
income earners lowers their employment rate. Overall effects, however, on both em-
ployment and GDP are relatively modest. Recent paper for Serbia by Randjelović and 
Marko Vladisavljević (2020) uses 2012 SILC data to analyze a shift from flat to 
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hypothetical progressive tax rates. They find that the change in tax rates would lead to 
a decrease in inequality by about 2.1 Gini points. Their analysis is based on the hypo-
thetical system of optimal progressive rates which are calibrated rather than compared 
to other countries. Furthermore, unlike the analysis presented here, which includes the 
change of the overall personal income tax system, their analysis is limited to a change 
in tax rates and does not include different personal allowances and, more importantly, 
the introduction of family allowances which significantly changes the results for dif-
ferent family types.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Data and Methods 
 
In order to analyze redistributive and fiscal impact of the personal income tax systems 
in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, we use the Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
(2017) data. Our analysis consists of two parts. For the first part, we use harmonized 
SILC data for all three countries to analyze the overall impact of taxes and social se-
curity contributions on the income inequality. We start from the formula for the calcu-
lation of the net household disposable income (HDI) according to Eurostat (2017)2:  
 𝐻𝐷𝐼 = 𝐻𝐺𝐼 – 𝑊𝑇 – 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 – ITSSC , (1)
 
according to which HDI is calculated as the difference between the total gross house-
hold income (HGI) and the sum of regular taxes on wealth (WT), regular inter-house-
hold cash transfer paid (Trans) and tax on income and social security contributions 
(ITSSC)3. We calculate Gini indices for household gross and disposable income as 
well as the change in the Gini coefficient due to effects of income tax and social secu-
rity contributions (ITSSC). Progressivity of the tax and social security contributions 
system is assessed using Kakwani index, which is the difference between the concen-
tration coefficient of ITSSC with respect to HGI and the Gini coefficient for HGI 
(Lustig 2018).  
Variable representing income taxes and social security contributions in the har-
monized version of EU-SILC incorporates: (1) labour income taxes; (2) non-labour 
income taxes (taxes on income from capital, rents, capital gains, authorship right, etc.); 
(3) social security contributions. Non-labour income taxes are mostly flat and account 
for a very small share of total public revenues in all three countries, so with little or no 
redistributive capacity, while contributions are not part of the personal income tax sys-
tem. Thus, when applying Slovenian and Croatian tax system to the case of Serbia we 
are primarily interested in the redistributive effects of personal labour income taxes.  
 
2 Eurostat. 2017. Methodological Guidelines and Description of EU-SILC Target Variables.  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1012329/8658951/Household+data+-+Income.pdf/b2ec94dd-
4929-4220-94a8-0dd4b87c8cac (accessed June 01, 2020). 
3 These income concepts are represented by the following variables in the harmonized SILC data: total 
household gross income - HY010; regular taxes on wealth - HY120G; regular inter-household cash transfer 
paid - HY130G; taxes on income and social contributions - HY140G; total disposable household income - 
HY020 (Eurostat 2017). Additionally, from the harmonized SILC data we use household identifiers to 
identify which persons belong to the same household, their age and income in order to determine their 
eligibility for treatment as dependent household family members. 
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Therefore, for the second part of our analysis, in order to differentiate between 
personal labour income taxes and other two groups of taxes within the ITSSC variable, 
in addition to harmonized SILC data, we use more detailed, non-harmonized version 
of SILC data for Serbia4. Non-harmonized version is needed in order to: (1) tackle the 
issue of tax evasion by excluding informal employment from taxation (as informal 
employment rate is higher in Serbia – at 20.7% in 2017); (2) to differentiate between 
yearly and monthly self-employment incomes which are taxed in a different way in all 
three countries. Informal employment includes workers without written contract or 
without social security contributions paid (for both employees and self-employed). 
Persons working in informal employment are excluded from the labour income tax 
calculation; however, their income is included in total household disposable income. 
We use the information on wages and other income from employment from 
non-harmonized version of SILC data and taxation rules in three countries to calculate 
the amount of labour income tax each individual within the Serbian households pays 
according to Serbian system (SER_TAX), or would pay according to Croatian 
(CRO_TAX) and Slovenian (SLO_TAX) system (see detailed description of the systems 
in Section 3.2). In the next step, new variable – ITSSC_res is defined as the difference 
between ITSSC and simulated labour taxes according to the current system in Serbia. 
By definition, ITSSC_res contains non-labour income taxes and social security contri-
butions currently paid in Serbia. Therefore, household (h) disposable income calcu-
lated using data for Serbia is equal to:   𝐻𝐷𝐼 = 𝐻𝐺𝐼 – 𝑊𝑇 – 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 – ITSSC + ∑ 𝑆𝐸𝑅 ,  (2)
 
where the only difference compared to Equation (1) is that total value of ITSSC house-
hold pays is now divided into two components – sum of labour taxes household mem-
bers pay according to Serbian tax system (∑ 𝑆𝐸𝑅_𝑇𝐴𝑋 ) and residual ITSSC which 
contain non-labour income taxes and social security contributions paid. We then use 
taxes, simulated following the rules of Slovenian and Croatian systems, to calculate 
disposable incomes in the case these tax systems are applied in Serbia:  
 𝐻𝐷𝐼_𝑐𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻𝐺𝐼 – 𝑊𝑇 – 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 – (ITSSC_𝑟𝑒𝑠 + ∑ 𝐶𝑅𝑂_𝑇𝐴𝑋 ), (3)
 𝐻𝐷𝐼_𝑠𝑙𝑜 = 𝐻𝐺𝐼 – 𝑊𝑇 – 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 – (ITSSC_𝑟𝑒𝑠 + ∑ 𝑆𝐿𝑂_𝑇𝐴𝑋 ), (4)
 
where HDI_cro and HDI_slo represent disposable incomes for Croatian and Slovenian 
tax systems, respectively. Therefore, we calculate disposable income for Croatian and 
Slovenian scenario by replacing labour taxes households pay according to Serbian sce-
nario with taxes paid according to Croatian and Slovenian scenario, while all other 
income components on the right side of the formula are assumed to remain unchanged.  
Progressivity of the labour tax system is estimated by using changes in Gini coeffi-
cients due to labour tax and Kakwani index, which is calculated as the difference be-
tween the concentration coefficient of labour tax with respect to HGI and the Gini 
coefficient for HGI. 
 
4 From the non-harmonized SILC data we use variables representing information on different sources of 
labour income (income from employment, and income from different types of self-employment), infor-
mation on type of contract (written contract or not) and types of social security contributions worker (or 
his employer) pays.  
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3.2 Parameters of the Labour Income Tax Systems  
 
Personal income tax system in Serbia includes only one tax rate – 10% applied to the 
gross wage. There is a personal tax allowance (“zero tax bracket”) for dependent em-
ployment of 11,790 RSD, which represents about 22% of the average pre-social secu-
rity contribution gross earnings income (APSGEI). For self-employed there is no per-
sonal allowance and the tax is paid on the full amount of the gross income. Based on 
Serbian tax schedule we calculate pre-social security contribution gross employment 
income (PSGEI) which is then used for calculating labour tax income based on Croa-
tian and Slovenian tax rules. All three systems are presented in Table A1 in the Ap-
pendix. 
In the Croatian system tax base is the difference between the pre-social security 
contribution gross employment income (PSGEI) and tax allowances. Due to lack of 
data we are not able to simulate tax deduction in the Croatian system which should 
also be subtracted from PSGEI5. Tax allowances consist of personal and family tax 
allowances. According to Urban, Čok, and Verbič (2019), personal tax allowance is 
set at 60% of APSGEI, while the tax allowance for each eligible adult in the family 
(spouse, parent, parent-in-low, etc.) is equal to 28% of APSGEI. The system includes 
progressive allowances for each additional dependent child starting from 28% of 
APSGEI for one child, 67% of APSGEI for two children to 122% of APSGEI for three 
children. For more children the following formula is applied: allowance = PAB * (0.5 
+ 0,05 * i * (i + 3)), where PAB is Personal allowance base, set at 2,500 HRK in 2017. 
In order to be considered as a dependent, total yearly income (without social 
benefits) of a dependent person must not exceed 16% of APSGEI (HRK 12,500 in 
2017 yearly). As there is no explicit criteria who is considered to be a child in the 
Croatian system, we assume that the differentiation between children and adult is being 
made in the same way as in Slovenian system. Children are those up to the 18 years of 
age or up to 26 if they are still in education. In the case there are two or more wage-
earners in the household, total family allowance is applied to the highest earner in the 
household. Croatian tax system in 2017 included two rates – tax rate of 24% applied 
to the tax base that does not exceed 2.27*APSGEI, while for the tax base above that 
threshold a rate of 36% is applied. In addition to the income tax, the wages in Croatia 
are subject to municipality “surtax” calculated as the amount of personal income tax 
multiplied by the surtax rate. Based on Urban, Slavko Bezeredi, and Martina Pezer 
(2017) we calculate these taxes according to the following rates: 16% for workers liv-
ing in densely populated areas, 12% for workers lining in intermediate populated areas 
and 6% for workers living in thinly populated areas.  
Similarly to the Croatian system, in Slovenia tax base is the difference between 
the PSGEI and personal and family tax allowances. As described in the Table A1 per-
sonal tax allowance for Slovenia is set between 36% (for low wages) and 18% (for 
high wages) of APSGEI depending on the PSGEI level. Tax allowance for each 
 
5 Deductions include: donations for cultural, educational, scientific, medical, humanitarian, sports and re-
ligious purposes and contributions paid to voluntary pension funds. Other deductions include: (a) deduc-
tions for self-employed who employ persons living in “special areas”; (b) deductions for self-employed, 
for expenditures on research and development, and outlays for education of young employees; (c) deduc-
tions for HRVI and receivers of HBDR related survivors pension, etc. 
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eligible adult in the family (spouse, parent, parent-in-low etc.) is set at 14% of 
APSGEI. The system includes progressive allowances for each additional dependent 
child, starting from 14% of APSGEI for one child 28% of APSGEI for two children, 
53% of APSGEI for three children. In order to be considered as a dependent adult, 
personal income (including taxes) of that person must be lower than family allowances 
for other dependent family members. In the case there are two or more wage-earners 
in the household total family allowance is applied to the highest earner in the house-
hold. Slovenian tax system in 2017 included five rates ranging from 16% to 50%, de-
pending on the size of the tax base.  
Figures A1 to A3 in the Appendix represent three personal income tax systems 
according to the rules described in Tables A1 and applied to Serbian earnings distri-
bution (and expressed through percentages of the average wage). Given one tax rate 
and low level of personal allowance, tax system in Serbia puts an equal burden on 
every household type irrespective of the number dependent family members. Croatian 
system taxes less heavily households with more dependent family members compared 
to the system in Serbia, as visible from the intersection points of solid and dashed line 
in the Figures A1-A3. Furthermore, regardless of the family structure, after crossing a 
threshold of about three average wages, taxes in case of Croatia constitute a much 
larger share of PSGEI compared to Serbia. By taxing lower-income households less 
and by putting a larger burden on those better-of Croatian system is clearly more pro-
gressive than the one in Serbia. The same applies to Slovenian tax schedule that is 




4.1 Progressivity of Labour Tax Systems in the Three Countries  
 
In this section we present the analysis of the harmonized SILC data for three countries. 
We first present components of household gross income (HGI) and distributional ca-
pacity of the entire income taxes and social security contributions (ITSSC) systems in 
three countries in Table 1. Values of wealth taxes and regular inter-household cash 
transfers paid6 are presented as the sum of these two components due to their low in-
dividual average value. Average HGI and HDI are the highest in Slovenia where the 
average income per adult equivalent is almost double the one in Croatia and more than 
four times higher than average household income in Serbia.  
The share of ITSSC in household gross income is higher in Serbia (28%) than 
in Slovenia (22.7%) and Croatia (20.5%). On the other hand, wealth taxes and regular 
inter-household cash transfer paid make less than 1% of HGI in all three countries. 
Table 2 presents income inequality in the three countries as measured by the 
Gini coefficient and the inequality reducing impact of the ITSSC systems. The highest 
inequality of the disposable income is found in Serbia where the Gini coefficient for 
 
6 Taxes on wealth are payable periodically on the ownership or use of land or buildings by the owners, and 
include current taxes on net wealth and on other assets (jewellery, other external signs of wealth). Inter-
household cash transfers include: compulsory alimony and child support, voluntary alimony and child sup-
port paid on a regular basis, regular cash support to persons other than household members and regular 
cash support to households in other countries. 
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household disposable income amounts to 37.8, with Croatia and Slovenia having much 
lower levels of inequality with Gini coefficients of 29.9 and 23.7, respectively.  
 






Wealth taxes and transfers Taxes on income and SSC Household disposable income 
Average Share in HGI Average Share in HGI Average Share in HGI 
Serbia 4,083 25 0.6% 1,142 28.0% 2,915 71.4% 
Croatia 8,668 39 0.5% 1,779 20.5% 6,851 79.0% 
Slovenia 17,749 144 0.8% 4,023 22.7% 13,583 76.5% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the SILC (2017) data.  
 
Higher disposable income inequality in Serbia is a result of higher gross income 
inequality (40.8 in Serbia, compared to 34.4 in Croatia and 29.0 in Slovenia), but is 
also a consequence of lower redistributive capacity of income taxes and social security 
contributions. In Serbia, ITSSC system reduces inequality of disposable income by 3 
Gini points, while in Croatia inequality is reduced by 4.5 and in Slovenia by 5.3 Gini 
points. The analysis of Kakwani index for the overall ITSSC component confirms this 
conclusion as index is much lower in Serbia (0.1) than in Slovenia or Croatia (0.2 and 
0.18 respectively). Higher Kakwani index points to higher progressivity of the tax sys-
tem. 
 
Table 2  Gini Indices and Progressivity of ITSSC System   
 











Serbia 0.408 0.378 0.030 0.508 0.100 
Croatia 0.344 0.299 0.045 0.532 0.188 
Slovenia 0.290 0.237 0.053 0.495 0.205 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the SILC (2017) data.  
 
4.2 Microsimulation Analysis: Policy Swapping Scenarios for Serbia 
 
In this section we use microsimulation analysis based on the harmonized and non-
harmonized SILC data for Serbia to separate the redistributive effect of labour taxes 
from the impact of non-labour income taxes and social security contributions. We then 
analyse changes in disposable income that would occur if the labour income tax system 
currently in place in Serbia is replaced with Croatian and Slovenian system, including 
both changes in the tax rates and in methods for the calculation of tax allowances. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and progressivity of simulated labour 
income taxes following the rules of the current tax system in Serbia and in case Croa-
tian and Slovenian labour taxation systems is applied on the Serbian labour income 
distribution. Given the relatively higher tax rates and lower allowance levels compared 
to Croatian system, the application of the Slovenian tax parameters would result in 
highest average taxes on labour income among the three countries. Since Croatian sys-
tem has the most generous allowances compared to other two countries it yields lowest 
average tax per adult equivalent.  
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Because Slovenian system has more tax brackets and the top tax rates are higher 
than in the case of Croatia its capacity to reduce inequality is larger than the capacity 
of the system in Croatia. On the other hand, allowances are much more generous in the 
Croatian tax schedule than in Slovenian which means that low income households are 
more exempted from the taxes and this would lead to lower poverty rates in case Cro-
atian system is applied to Serbian population. Finally, tax revenues collected with the 
Slovenian system would be almost double the amount of revenues collected with cur-
rent taxation rules in Serbia or in case Croatian tax parameters are applied.  
We also observe from Table 3 that labour taxes in Serbia are slightly more pro-
gressive than remaining part of the ITSSC, evidenced by much higher Kakwani index 
(0,137 for labour taxes; 0.1 for total ITSSC; compare Tables 2 and 3). However, out 
of the 3 Gini points reduction capacity of the ITSSC only 0.7 is due to labour taxes 
(compare Tables 2 and 3). This is due to the fact that labour taxes represent only about 
16% of total ITSSC.  
 
Table 3  Redistributive and Budgetary Effects of Labour Taxes in Serbia according to Three Labour 
Tax Scenarios 
 
 Descriptive statistics Progressivity (compared to HGI) 





Gini decrease due to 
labour tax 
Serbian 185 4.5% 802 0.137 0.007 
Croatian 142 3.5% 650 0.444 0.021 
Slovenian 341 8.4% 1,513 0.314 0.036 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the SILC (2017) data for Serbia. 
 
The application of the Croatian or Slovenian labour tax system to Serbian earn-
ings distribution would clearly result in stronger reduction in inequality compared to 
the current system in place. Kakwani index for Serbian taxes is 0.137, while the same 
index for Croatian and Slovenian tax system is 0.444 and 0.314. At the same time, Gini 
decrease due to labour taxes is more prominent in the case of Croatian and Slovenian 
systems (reduction of 2.1 and 3.6 Gini points, respectively) than for the Serbian one. 
When we compare the two reforms, Croatian tax schedule is more progressive in the 
terms of Kakwani index due to higher share of earnings exempted from taxes (Figures 
A1 to A3 in the Appendix). On the other hand, because taxes have higher shares in 
earnings along the whole distribution (Figures A1 to A3 in the Appendix), the system 
in Slovenia has a larger redistributive capacity compared to the one in Croatia as evi-
denced by the higher Gini decrease due to labour taxes (Table 3).  
Figure 1 extends the analysis of the progressivity of the three tax systems by 
looking at the share of labour taxes in total HGI according to percentiles of the HGI 
distribution. All three systems are applied to Serbian data. Given the very generous tax 
allowances in Croatian system labour taxes are practically non-existing for the bottom 
half of the HGI distribution. From the 6th to the 9th decile they are increasing rapidly 
but only at the top of the distribution they are higher than the ones in the current Ser-
bian system. On the other hand, labour taxes according to Slovenian system are lower 
than the ones currently applied in Serbia for bottom half of the HGI distribution, but 
higher starting from 6th income decile. For the top income decile Slovenian system 
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yields very high taxes – up to 20% of the HGI, while for the current system in Serbia 
taxes for top income decile are not larger than 6% of HGI. Figure 1 also indicates that 






Notes: Percentiles are calculated using the household gross income (HGI) per adult equivalent. Lines in the graph pre-
sent the share of labour taxes in the HGI. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the SILC (2017) data for Serbia. 
 
 
Figure 1  Share of Labour Taxes in Total HGI at Different Deciles of HGI Distribution 
 
In Figure 2 we present how differences in the tax systems would translate in the 
changes in the equivalised household disposable income (HDI). Figure 2 shows per-
centage changes in HDI that would occur if Serbian tax system is replaced by Croatian 
and Slovenian one. For the Croatian tax schedule, HDI would be higher across the 
whole income distribution, except for the top decile. This is due to the fact that param-
eters of the Croatian system generate taxes that are lower than taxes resulting from the 
Serbian system at all parts of the distribution except for the very top (Figure 1). Posi-
tive changes in HDI are mostly pronounced at the middle of income distribution where 
equivalised HDI would be higher by up to 5%. At the top of the distribution HDI would 
be lower by no more than 10%.  
Due to higher average taxes in Slovenian system average HDI would decrease. 
However, as evidenced in Figure 2, that shows changes in the disposable income per 
adult equivalent per percentiles in Serbia that would occur if Slovenian and Croatian 
labour taxes were applied instead of the current system, HDI at lower parts of the dis-
tribution would increase (by maximum of 3%), while incomes at the upper half of the 
distribution would decrease. This corresponds to the previous Figure 1 where param-
eters of the Slovenian system generate lower taxes compared to Serbian system in the 
lower half of the distribution but higher in the upper part of the distribution. The de-
crease in HDI is most prominent at the top of the income, up to 20%.   
In Figure 3 we present the same indicator as in Figure 2, but now contrasting 
the effects that the tax system change would have on equivalised HDIs of households 
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of age (right panel). Again, we are looking here at changes in the disposable income 
in Serbia that would occur if current system is replaced with Slovenian and Croatian 
labour taxes. Changes in the HDI of households without children (which represent 
about half of the population) is similar the one presented in Figure 2: for Croatian 
system HDI is lower at all parts of the distribution apart from the top decile; while for 
Slovenian system HDI is slightly higher at bottom half and lower at the upper half of 
the distribution. For households with two or more children (that constitute about one 
quarter of the population in Serbia) we observe that two lines representing HDI change 
have moved up and more to the right indicating that, compared to households without 
children, a higher share of these households would experience positive effects on their 
HDIs due to reforms of the tax systems. This is because higher tax allowances for 
households with more dependent household members means they are being taxed less. 
Croatian system would bring increase of the HDI of up to 7% for the middle of the 
income distribution while only households at the very top would experience decrease 
of their HDI. In the case of the Slovenian tax schedule incomes of the households at 
the bottom two-thirds of the income distribution would increase by maximum of 5%, 





Notes: Percentiles are calculated using the baseline household disposable per adult equivalent income. Changes in the 
disposable income are presented as the percentage growth of the disposable per adult equivalent income in the reform 
scenario compared to the baseline scenario. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the SILC (2017) data for Serbia. 
 
Figure 2  Changes in the Disposable Income per Adult Equivalent per Percentiles in Serbia 
 
In Table 4 we calculate inequality and poverty indicators for the three systems 
for the general population and across different household types. HDI Gini index would 
decrease by 1.4 and 2.8 points in case current tax rules in Serbia are replaced with the 
ones applied in Croatia and Slovenia, respectively. As Figure 2 shows lower inequality 
stems mainly from the lower HDI at the top of the income distribution in the case these 
two system were applied. Slovenian tax schedule has higher inequality reducing ca-
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Notes: Percentiles are calculated using the baseline household disposable per adult equivalent income. Changes in the 
disposable income are presented as the percentage growth of the disposable per adult equivalent income in the reform 
scenario compared to the baseline scenario. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the SILC (2017) data for Serbia. 
 
Figure 3  Changes in the Disposable Income per Adult Equivalent in Serbia per Percentiles in House-
holds without Children (Left), Households with Two or more Children (Right) 
 
At risk-of-poverty rate would decrease by 1.2 percentage points if Serbian tax 
parameters are replaced with Croatian system and 0.8 percentage points if replaced 
with Slovenian one. Higher poverty reducing impact of Croatian system is due to large 
tax allowances for individuals with low earnings which result in higher increase of 
their HDI. Tax allowances in both systems are more generous for households with two 
or more children which leads to larger increase of HDI  (Figure 3, right) and reduction 
of their poverty rates – by 1.9 percentage points for Croatian system and 1.5 for Slo-
venian. This is particularly relevant given that households with two or more children 
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Table 4 Household Disposable Income in Serbia (in €, per Adult Equivalent, Annual) according to Three 
Labour Tax Scenarios 
 
Tax system Gini index (HDI) 
At-risk-of- poverty rate
Overall Households without children
Households with one 
child
Households with two or 
more children 
Serbian 0.378 25.7% 23.1% 23.8% 32.1% 
Croatian 0.364 24.5% 22.2% 23.1% 30.2% 
Slovenian 0.350 24.9% 22.5% 23.4% 30.6% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the SILC (2017) data for Serbia. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite sharing a common background Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia developed their 
fiscal systems in different ways over the last three decades. Our results indicate that 
the redistributive capacity of the Slovenian income tax system is largest among the 
three countries with Serbia being the least able to reduce inequality with tax instru-
ments and Croatia falling between the two. When this is coupled with lowest pre-fiscal 
income inequality in Slovenia and highest in Serbia the result is that Slovenia has one 
of the lowest inequalities of disposable income in Europe, Serbia one of the highest, 
while Croatia is at the average EU level of income inequality.  
This paper reviewed changes in personal income taxation in three countries of 
the former Yugoslavia after its dissolution. Given the socialist legacy it was expected 
that high value would be placed on equity in redesigning the tax schedule but while in 
Slovenia and Croatia that was a case, tax reforms in Serbia neglected equity concerns. 
Serbia followed the path of large number of former communist countries that adopted 
flat tax although it was never on the list of reforms that the European Union in the 
accession process or the international financial institutions suggested them to imple-
ment. In fact, World Bank and International Monetary Fund even warned against con-
sequences of the flat tax solution in terms of lower revenues collected and adverse 
effects on inequality. For domestic policy makers adopting flat taxes was an oppor-
tunity to signal to the investors that they are business-friendly environments. This was 
despite the fact that there was no evidence that flat tax could really improve the com-
petitiveness of the country or attract new investments, as former communist economies 
were among the first one to experiment with this kind of tax schedule. 
Our paper is a reminder of the rarely mentioned episode from the 1990s when 
Serbia opted for the progressive tax schedule but if was effectively suspended from the 
start due to political and economic crisis in the country. After the regime changes in 
2000s flat tax system was a choice of the policy makers while re-introduction of the 
progressive parameters was never considered. In 2000s Slovenia and Croatia discussed 
reforms of their system along the lines of a flat tax proposals. Slovenia showed to have 
the most mature policy debates with many stakeholders included in discussing policy 
alternatives. It preserved the progressive structure of its personal income tax system 
with many tax brackets. Croatia, on the other hand, was more tempted to switch to flat 
tax and though it has not been adopted discussions around the topic affected the re-
forms of the tax system that was pretty much simplified over the years.  
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By applying Slovenian and Croatian personal income tax schedules to a Serbian 
context our results show that Slovenian system has larger capacity to reduce income 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. Croatian system would achieve lower 
levels of poverty given more generous tax allowances that lead to tax exemption of 
low-income households.  Both systems provide larger tax allowances for more numer-
ous households and therefore have higher capacity to reduce their poverty rates.  
In the period following the 2008 crisis many countries started to question the 
flat tax and suggested the return to more progressive tax schedules. First one was Slo-
vakia in 2013 soon to be followed by Czech Republic. Albania, Ukraine, and Latvia 
abandoned their flat taxes in the aftermath of the 2008 economic turmoil. With new 
crisis on the horizon due to COVID-19 pandemics and expectations that inequality and 
poverty would increase this could be a new opportunity to question the benefits of flat 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  Personal Income Tax Systems in 2017 
 
 Slovenia Croatia Serbia 
 % APSGEI % APSGEI % APSGEI 
General (personal) allowance
Income bracket 1 0-62 0-∞ 0-∞ 
Amount 1 36 60 22 (for employees) 
Income bracket 2 62-72 / /
Amount 2 25 / /
Income bracket 3 >70 / /
Amount 3 18 / /
Allowance for dependants 
Spouse 14 28 /
1 child 14 28 /
2 children 28 67 /
3 children 53 123 /
Income brackets (rates) 
Bottom 0-45 (16%) 0-277 (24%) 0-∞ (10%*) 
Middle 1 45-114 (7%)
Middle 2 114-268 (34%)
Middle 3 268-396 (39%) >277 (36%)
Top >396 (50%)
 
Notes: APSGEI: average pre-sic gross employment income. APSGEI in Croatia in 2017: HRK 75,718. APSGEI in Slovenia 
in 2017 17,896 euros. APSGEI in Serbia in 2017 51,354 RSD7. In Slovenia there is additional allowance for 4th dependant 
children 34.58%, 44.46% for fifth child and additional 9.8% for each next child. * Tax base for Serbia is gross wage which 
beside APSGEI includes social security contributions. At the level of the average APSGEI. 
 
Source: Slovenian and Croatian system are presented according to Urban, Čok, and Verbič (2019).  





Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure A1  Share of PIT in the Pre-SIC Gross Earnings Income for a Person with a Dependent Spouse 






7 This amount is scaled down in the simulations for the difference between the average wages in adminis-
trative and survey data. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure A2  Share of PIT in the Pre-SIC Gross Earnings Income for a Person with a Dependent Person 





Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure A3  Share of PIT in the Pre-SIC Gross Earnings Income for a Person with No Dependents, 
Compared to the Level of the Net Wage 
 
